



The Airside Departure Process: Observations & Queuing Models



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
Overview

- Observations at BOS
 - Queuing Model of Taxi Out Process with Aircraft Passing
 - Observations at EWR
 - Queuing Model of Departure Flow with Downstream Constraints
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
Interactive Queuing System




Uncertainty in Pushback Time



Passing During Taxi-Out



Histogram of swap magnitude at Logan airport



Comparison of 5 U.S. airports



Key Observations

- Airport is an interactive queuing system.
 - Runway is the key flow constraint.
 - Gates, Ramps and Taxiways are secondary flow constraints.
 - Downstream constraints manifest at different points in the system such as at the runways and at the gates.
 - High uncertainty in pushback time.
 - Significant passing during taxi-out.
 - ATC workload can be a flow constraint.
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Queuing Model of Taxi Out Process with Aircraft Passing

➤ Motivation:


- ⇒ Current queuing models for taxi out time are based on the **number of aircraft** taxiing out when aircraft being considered is pushed back from the gate.
- ⇒ Field observations and interviews at BOS indicate that there is significant **passing** that occurs **during taxi out** and that the taxi time is most strongly correlated with **configuration, airline** (surrogate for terminal) and **queue at runway**.

➤ Modeling Approach:


- ⇒ Divide data based on configuration and airline
- ⇒ Quantify passing behavior as **$P(Q|N)$**
- ⇒ Use passing behavior to map N to Q and then to T

$$\bar{T}(N) = \sum_Q [T(Q) * P(Q | N)]$$


Taxi-Out Time vs. N Aircraft@Pushback



Passing Behavior




Taxi-Out Time vs. Takeoff Queue Size






Taxi-Out Time vs. Takeoff Queue Size (given Configuration and Airline)



$T(Q)$ for BOS configuration 27/22L-22R/22L and American Airlines


$P(\text{Queue Size } Q \mid N \text{ Aircraft@Pushback})$



Distributions $P(Q \mid N)$ for BOS configuration 4R/4L-9/4R/4L and US airlines



Taxi-Out Time vs. N Aircraft@Pushback (with Passing Behavior Included)



$T(N)$ for BOS configuration 4R/4L-9/4R/4L and Continental Airlines

Model Performance

	Running Average	Queuing Model
Mean absolute difference between actual and predicted taxi	5.69 minutes	4.56 minutes
% predicted within 5 minutes of actual taxi	53.74%	65.63%

Group	t Value	Prob > t	95% Confidence Interval for Difference of Means	
			Lower Limit	Upper Limit
Actual - Running Avg	-10.66	<.0001	-1.46	-1.00
Actual - Queuing Model	-0.848	0.3966	-0.30	0.12
Running Avg - Queueing Model	-14.21	<.0001	-1.30	-1.00




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Cause of Weather Delays: EWR

- Sensitivity to weather
 - ⇒ Runway limitations
 - ⇒ Limited gate space
- Frequency of adverse weather
- The schedule operated at the airport
- New York airspace congestion



EWR System Study

➤ Site visit Thursday, June 29, 2000

⇒ Observations at NY TRACON, EWR Tower, CO Ramp Tower

⇒ “Worst summer ever”

⇒ Just before July 4th weekend

⇒ Large delays the previous day


⇒ Severe Weather Avoidance Program
(SWAP) active, 1pm – 10:30pm EDT

⇒ Data collected focuses on departures




June 29, 2000 – National Weather

National Doppler Radar Map



EWR Fix-Destination Mapping




Impact on Delays


— Running plot of average departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from EWR




— Running plot of number of aircraft waiting to depart from EWR



Impact on Delays




Restrictions Applied to Fix [Orange] Fix closed [Red]



Pre-Sequencing

Running plot of average departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart EWR



High CO arrival delays

Effect of pre-sequencing



Key Observations

- Non-local restrictions (e.g. arrival restrictions at destination) and time-windowing (e.g. DSP or EDCT) has less airport-wide impact than flow-restrictions (e.g. MIT metering) at local fixes.
 - ⇒ Large impact per flight but only a few flights are affected.
 - Controllers can impose minor MIT or MINIT restrictions over departure fix (e.g. stretching 3-mile takeoff minimum to 5 MIT) in TRACON airspace without impacting throughput.
 - ⇒ This flexibility is limited by workload involved in necessary sequencing, and traffic distribution among fixes.
-



Key Observations

- Restrictions caused by coupling of local weather, downstream weather and traffic demand.
 - ⇒ Some fixes impacted by local weather but unrestricted because of light traffic.
 - ⇒ Some fixes not impacted by local weather but restricted because of downstream weather.
 - Opportunities for reroutes not utilized because of inter-facility coordination required.
 - ⇒ Gap in weather to south not utilized for west reroutes because of coordination required with Washington Center & Cleveland Center.
 - Airline planning (e.g. pre-sequencing) can reduce delays.
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Queuing Model of Departure Flow with Downstream Constraints

➤ Motivation:


- ⇒ Current queuing models for airport surface traffic focus on **runways** as major bottleneck.
- ⇒ Field observations and interviews at BOS and EWR indicate that **downstream flow constraints** as a major source of delay and that the closure of **departure fixes** are the most severe class of flow constraints.

➤ Modeling Approach:


- ⇒ Use observations at BOS and EWR to extend queuing model to include the effects of fix closures.
- ⇒ Test extended model via Monte Carlo simulation with EWR operations data collected on 2000-06-29.

Extending the Queuing Model (I)

- Many aircraft were pushed back on-time, only to be held in parking areas or “penalty boxes” during fix closures.
 - ⇒ Parking areas did not impede normal surface traffic.
 - ⇒ Parking capacity was not a limiting factor.
- Runway 11/29 was used for less than 4% of flights.
 - ⇒ Queuing model only requires a single runway queue.



Extending the Queuing Model (II)



- Right side of figure:
 - ⇒ Original queuing model
- Left side of figure:
 - ⇒ Fix-closure effects
- When fix closes, A/C move to “buffers”, and stop making progress toward takeoff.
- When fix opens, A/C start making progress again.
- A/C which leave runway queue must re-enter at end of the queue (i.e. they lose their spot in line).





Calibration and Testing

- Operations data:
 - ⇒ Taken from CATER system and TRACON logs.
 - ⇒ Data set for 11:00 to 19:00 EDT on July 29, 2000.
 - Stochastic runway service time:
 - ⇒ Estimated from 09:00 to 11:00 period (very light restrictions).
 - ⇒ Triangular density (mode of 1 minute, range of 0 to 2 minutes).
 - Stochastic unimpeded taxi-out times:
 - ⇒ Estimated for major passenger carriers from 1998 ASQP data.
 - ⇒ Same distribution (9.75 ± 2.75 min.) assumed for other carriers.
 - Testing Procedure:
 - ⇒ Run Monte Carlo simulation of traffic over 11:00 to 19:00.
 - ⇒ Compute average results over 40 Monte Carlo runs.
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Monte Carlo Results: Early Period (11:00 to 15:00 EDT)



- Simulation accurately tracks observed number of departing A/C.
- 88% of flights (107 out of 122) have taxi-time error \ddagger of 10min or less. Of the 15 outliers, 8 used LANNA fix, with 40MIT from 13:05 to 15:50.
- In contrast, original queuing model gives errors of up to 3 hours for flights hit by fix closures, and wider distribution of errors for other flights.



\ddagger : Def'n of taxi-time "error": Difference between actual taxi-time and average simulated taxi-time.

Monte Carlo Results: Late Period (15:00 to 19:00 EDT)

- Much larger number of restrictions during this period. Simulation tracks poorly until 17:00 when it starts to recover.
- Flights through ELIOT and PARKE account for most of the extreme errors. Both fixes closed from 16:00 to 16:30 and again from 18:10 to 19:00, but had only 20MIT during remaining period; hence large delays must be due to some other cause.





Research Questions

- *Question:* After a fix closure is lifted, what is the expected response-time for fix throughput to reach capacity? Can this response-time be minimized by buffering A/C in different parts of the system?
 - *Question:* At many airports, departure fixes are clustered, e.g. the West fixes at EWR. Are there workable re-routing procedures which could switch fixes (and thus avoid closures) in response to local weather?
 - *Question:* What is the utility of lead-time information on upcoming changes to fix restrictions?
 - *Question:* What level of MIT/MINIT spacing effectively closes a fix?
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Further Extensions to the Model

- Severe spacing restrictions can combine with high traffic levels, overloading the flexibility to meet such restrictions via re-sequencing before takeoff or vectoring after takeoff. To correctly model effects of spacing restrictions, need to capture sequencing logic of controllers.
- Airspace buffering for departures is not currently observed. However, may be worth extending model in that direction, to evaluate potential benefits (setting aside workload and procedural issues for the moment).

