# US and EU Taxi Out Delay and Potential US Policy Options

January 15, 2010

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GRA, Incorporated



## Significant Difference in Taxi Out Delays EU vs. US

Estimated excess time on flights to/from the main 34 airports (2007)		TIME per flight (minutes)		Predictability
		EUR	US	
Gate/ departure	en-route-related	1.4	0.1	Low
holdings	airport-related	1.4	1.1	Low
Taxi-out phase		(3.7)	(6.8)	Medium
Horizontal en-route flight efficiency		2.2-3.8	1.5-2.7	High
Terminal areas (ASMA/TMA)		3.2	2.5	Medium
Total estimated excess time per flight		11.9-13.5	12.0-13.2	


<sup>\*</sup> Identified as a possible opportunity for US improvement

Source: Knorr and Fron


## Definition: Taxi Out Delay

- → Definition: Taxi out delay is defined as time spent between pushback and wheels up in excess of unimpeded time (ASPM)
  - Higher in US than in Europe

Average excess time in the taxi out phase (Top 20 in terms of annual movements in 2007 are shown)



Note concentration of problem





Source: Knorr and Fron

## **Executive Summary**

- Institutional differences (slots;control of airport surface) between US and EU contribute to differences in departure queuing
- → Two departure control and two allocation approaches being worked on in US for instances when ADR< Demand:

Allocation Method	Departure Control			
	ATCT	Airport		
Collaborative Virtual Queue	Aircraft calls for pushback; placed in Virtual Queue on FCFS basis; ATCT issues pushback clearance	Aircraft calls for pushback; placed in Virtual Queue on FCFS basis; Ramp Tower issues pushback clearance		
Ration by Schedule	ATCT issues slots (=ADR) per schedule; carriers select flight for each slot; ATCT issues pushback clearance	•		
	Change in Ground Controller Function  Nextgen Acquisition	Local Airline Agreement  Airport Acquisition		

→ Important Question: How to Meld these approaches



### Some Reasons for US vs. EU Differences



## Summary of Institutional Differences US vs. EU

When the Runway is the Scarce Asset				
	US	EU		
Demand	Not limited	Limited by slots		
Demand/Capacity	Demand often → VMC capacity	Demand ← IMC capacity		
Gates and Other Facilities	Preferential or exclusive	Common use; included in slot		
Ramp/Apron/Taxiway/Runway	Ramp/apron independently management	All managed by ATCT		
Consequences	Taxi out queue inevitable Reductions in ADR cause severe delay Schedule padding includes expected queuing	Taxi queues limited to feed runway Reductions in ADR less problematic Schedules less padded		
Airport CDM	Without traditional slots*, improve management of queue. Use CVQ with first come first served, or RBS and department slots** based on ADR	Improve management of deviations from schedule by exchanging departure flow information and optimizing sequence		

<sup>\*</sup>HDR style slots


<sup>\*\*</sup>Slots created on day of flight based on ADR in a time period

### Possible New Motivation for Airlines

- → New DOT Consumer Rule Limits Airline Tarmac Delays, Provides Other Passenger Protections (DOT-OST-2007-0022)
  - Prohibits U.S. airlines operating domestic flights from permitting an aircraft to remain on the tarmac for more than three hours without deplaning passengers
  - Carriers are required to provide adequate food and potable drinking water for passengers within two hours of the aircraft being delayed on the tarmac and to maintain operable lavatories and, if necessary, provide medical attention.
  - Prohibits airlines from scheduling chronically delayed flights, subjecting those who do to DOT enforcement action for unfair and deceptive practices;

# EU Airport CDM: Framework to Manage Deviations from Schedule; Insure Proper Use of Slots

#### **EU AIRPORT CDM -- FEATURING CONSTANT UPDATE OF INFORMATION AMONG ALL PARTIES**






Ime

Before

**Pushback** 

## In US: ATCT Usually Manages Movement Area But Not Ramp/Apron and Demand Often > ADR



## **US Airport CDM Concepts**



## RTCA Recommendations for Surface Management

- → Surveillance systems in the movement and non movement areas (2010-2014)
- → Situational awareness systems (2010-2014)
- Communications
  - Interoperability standards (2014-2018)
  - Datacomm (2009-2014)
- → Enhanced situational awareness (2014-2018)
- But method of allocating scarce departure capacity not featured

Source: NEXTGEN Mid-Term Implementation Task Force Report (9 September 2009)

## Two Views of Departure Capacity Allocation

- → (1) Collaborative Virtual Queue (CVQ): Preserve First Come First
  Served but limit queuing
  - Aircraft call for pushback and are placed in a virtual queue
  - Aircraft remain at the gate or move to alternate parking spot
  - Once additional aircraft are needed for the queue, the "oldest" plane in the virtual queue is given a pushback clearance
    - Airline may swap a higher valued aircraft that is ready

- → (2) Ration By Schedule (RBS): Allocate available capacity (ADR) per Schedule and issue departure slots; limit queuing
  - Airline decides which aircraft it wants to use the slots; manages departure time, gates, other issues
  - Consistent with existing CDM principles

## Key Distinction Between Two Concepts

- Collaborative Virtual Queue: access to the runway remains first come first served
  - Aircraft enter the virtual queue in the same way they enter the actual queue today
  - A carrier gains an advantage by calling for pushback as early as feasible
    - No change in incentives
- → RBS: access to runway is via allocated slots (based on ADR)
  - There is no advantage to call for pushback as early as feasible since an airline will only have a finite number of slots in a time period
  - Potentially, some gate delay could be taken in the terminal instead of onboard the aircraft
  - But this is a significant change in airline "rights"

Neither is a substitute for traditional slots. Neither restricts "over-scheduling" relative to departure capacity

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## Two Ways to Control Departure Allocation Process

- → ATCT Centric: ATCT would issue pushback clearances
  - Similar to EU process including NEXTGEN technology applications to exchange information and track flights in real time
  - Increased ATCT controller workload
  - Requires FAA investment
- → Airport Centric: Meld ASDE-X and other Situational Awareness tools with airline agreement to role of Coordinator; create website to share information on flights and allocation of departure capacity, weather etc.
  - Precedent: JFK Winter Operations
  - No change in ATCT workload or investment
  - Airport/operators pay for departure manager software and personnel

## Advantages of ATCT and Airport Centric Approaches


### → ATCT Centric Approach:

- Improves flight departure management better overall TFM
- Single entity has control of airport surface
- FAA is a neutral party
- Consistent with Nextgen plan for "Arrival/Departure Management Tool" (2017)

### → Airport Centric Approach:

- Can be done now (e.g. JFK Winter Irrops)
- Does not increase ATCT work load or require major FAA investment
  - May create time for controllers to deal with closed fixes and/or desirable flight sequences
- FAA can still capture improvement in departure management for overall TFM via web page

# Both CVQ and RBS Would Work w/ Planned Nextgen Acquisitions/ ATCT Centric Plans



**TFM Constraints** 




**Surface** 

Arrival/Departure Demand



Integrated Tower Display Suite



Flight Data Management

#### **Operational Users**

ATCT Controllers
Flight
Clearance
Ground
Local

**Terminal TMC** 

Airline and Dispatch
Airport Authority

**Airport Security** 

### <u>Activities</u>

Pushback control

Taxi control

Taxi conformance

**Departure sequencing** 

Departure route assurance

Runway configuration and load-balancing




**Airport Weather** 




Terminal and Surface Surveillance




## A U.S. CDM Concept with CVQ: ATCT Manages Demand




# A U.S. CDM Concept with RBS: ATCT Manages Demand



## Both CVQ and RBS Would Work w/ Airport Centric Coordinator of Departure Process



**TFM Constraints** 



**Surface** 

Demand/Capacity Profile



**Airport Weather** 



**Departure Capacity Allocation** 

#### **Operational Users**

**ATCT Controllers** 

**Terminal TMC** 

**Airline and Dispatch** 

**Airport Authority** 

**Airport Security** 

#### **Activities**

Pushback control


Taxi control

Taxi conformance

**Departure sequencing** 


**Departure route** assurance

**Runway configuration** and load-balancing




Situational Awareness

# Alternative US Airport CDM: "Coordinator" Manages Departures via CVQ





# Alternative US Airport CDM: "Coordinator" Manages Departures via RBS





# Work is Required to Determine If/How to Meld the ATCT and Airport Centric Approaches

- → As NextGen is evolving with ATCT Centric Approach
- → How does Airport Centric Approach merge with the new technologies and operational concepts?
- → Can Advantages of Airport Centric Approach be captured NOW
  - JFK demonstration this spring: procedures/software/systems are near maturity
    - One metric: JFK Winter IRROPS has eliminated secondary deicing at JFK
  - Reduced future work load and FAA investment

## Some Issues with Airport CDM



### Possible Legal Issues with the Alternatives

### If ATCT Controls Both Pushback and Taxi Clearances Using CVQ or RBS:

- → FAA has traditionally avoided safety oversight and operational control of ramp and apron areas
- → If FAA assumes control over ramp and apron:
  - It might assume some liabilities for accidents and injuries in those areas
  - It would be overriding private carrier contracts

If Coordinator Appointed by Airport Allocates Slots Using CVQ or RBS:

- → Requires carrier agreement but carriers would not do the allocation
  - Avoids carriers allocating scarce departure capacity, which might be subject to anti-trust enforcement
  - Carrier scheduling committees can only be convened under FAA auspices

Requires review with Chief Counsel's office



### Some Other Potential Issues

- → At most airports, dominant carrier(s) will be the chief beneficiary
  - A carrier with only a few flights will have a very small share of departure slots and may choose to opt out of an agreement to sanction the Airport Centric Approach
  - Possible Solution: FAA to develop a master agreement to cover congested airports nationwide; then carriers need only agree on trigger for implementing departure management at each airport
- → Holding aircraft at gates directly affects pilot pay and on-time performance
  - Brake release triggers Flight Pay (most mainline airlines)
    - Pilot cost per block hour falls if aircraft held at gate
  - Brake release is measure of DOT departure time
    - Disincentive for carriers to take some delay at gate
    - Suggestion: Examine trade-offs of changing on-time measurement to some Standardized Elapsed Time Concept (TBD)
- → Gate constraints may make gate holds difficult to manage
  - Tightly scheduled inter-gate time could trigger inbound queues
  - Possible Solution: w/ ATCT cooperation, carriers unable to manage gates are given more circuitous taxi routings
  - Possible Solution: Set maximum gate hold time to help airlines manage

## Chief Beneficiaries of Airport CDM are Largest Operators at PHL

→ If airport CDM manages departures so that the maximum queue length was 10 aircraft (at runway and taxiing)

Time in excess of unimpeded taxi time

		✓ OAG		Maximum Queue Length = 10			
Airline	Departures	Tot.Excess Time	Avg Queue	Avg. Queue Time	Tot.Excess Time	Avg Queue	Avg. Queue Time
9E	5	0:39:33	6.8	0:07:55	0:22:49	3.8	0:04:34
AA	22	2:36:36	6.0	0:07:07	1:36:27	3.5	0:04:23
AC	5	0:21:49	4.6	0:04:22	0:13:27	2.4	0:02:41
AF	1	0:14:11	13.0	0:14:11	0:09:23	8.0	0:09:23
BA	2	0:29:43	13.5	0:14:51	0:07:26	2.5	0:03:43
CO	11	1:26:24	6.9	0:07:51	0:45:45	3.5	0:04:10
DL	14	1:19:25	4.9	0:05:40	0:28:51	1.9	0:02:04
F9	2	0:06:57	3.5	0:03:29	0:06:57	3.5	0:03:29
FL	18	3:48:25	10.5	0:12:41	2:26:21	6.1	0:08:08
JM	1	0:06:43	5.0	0:06:43	0:06:14	5.0	0:06:14
LH	1	0:00:00	0.0	0:00:00	0:00:00	0.0	0:00:00
NW	13	0:36:37	2.6	0:02:49	0:23:31	1.7	0:01:49
ОН	7	0:27:37	3.7	0:03:57	0:05:51	0.9	0:00:50
00	2	0:00:00	0.0	0:00:00	0:00:00	0.0	0:00:00
U5	3	0:04:12	1.3	0:01:24	0:06:58	1.7	0:02:19
<b>UA</b>	19	1:43:44	4.9	0:05:28	0:44:38	2.3	0:02:21
US	457	85:02:46	9.8	0:11:10	35:26:45	3.9	0:04:39
WN	66	14:58:27	11.5	0:13:37	7:16:06	5.0	0:06:36
XE	4	0:32:51	7.5	0:08:13	0:00:00	0.0	0:00:00
YV	1	0:10:14	9.0	0:10:14	0:07:32	7.0	0:07:32
YX	2	0:16:08	7.0	0:08:04	0:06:32	3.0	0:03:16
TOTALS	656	115:02:22	9.2	0:10:31	50:41:33	3.8	0:04:38

Source: GRA queuing model for 17 August 07 (as scheduled)

Avg. Excess Queue Time Cut in Half



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### Under CDM, Carriers Deal w/ Gate Constraints


	Avg. Intergate	Minimum Intergate	
Airline	Time	Time	Turns
1	244	30	16
2	211	64	19
3	221	147	4
4	77	77	1
5	92	15	198
6	45	45	1
7	68	68	1
8	153	15	52
9	216	37	15
10	272	40	16
11	280	61	9
12	229	54	16

May need some other location to hold if airline cannot manage own gates


PHL 17Aug07

Intergate times measured in minutes

## Preferred Taxi Routing for Carriers Managing Gate Constraints



## The Impact of Capping Gate Delays: PHL 80% ADR






# Benefits and Costs of Airport CDM Initial Analysis of PHL



## Rough BCA for PHL

- → Apply EU Airport CDM Benefit Cost model to estimate costs
  - Adjusted for size of airport (PHL is 2X average airport in model)
- → Benefits estimated from GRA queuing model (17AUG07) and Sensis simulation (19NOV09)
  - Fuel
  - Emissions
  - Excludes potential benefits of improved reliability
- → PHL selected because it is a pure case:
  - High departure demand relative to capacity
  - Very limited taxi routings
  - Gate constraints

## PHL Taxi Delays Inevitable Even Without Disruptions



As scheduled average queue length: 9.2 aircraft



## Initial Estimate of PHL Annualized Fuel Savings

	17 Aug 07	Fuel Cost Avoided
Airline	Departures	(\$2 gal)
9E	5	\$18,273
AA	22	\$65,684
AC	5	\$9,136
AF	1	\$5,242
BA	2	\$24,333
CO	11	\$44,390
DL	14	\$55,219
F9	2	\$0
FL	18	\$89,617
JM	1	\$528
LH	1	\$0
NW	13	\$14,305
OH	7	\$23,769
00	2	\$0
U5	3	-\$3,021
UA	19	\$64,537
US	457	\$3,249,810
WN	66	\$504,886
XE	4	\$35,872
YV	1	\$2,948
YX	2	\$10,483
TOTALS	656	\$4,216,012

Based on annualizing 17 August 07 (as scheduled); Fuel consumption rate per Levy et al: "Quantification and Forecasting from Taxiing Aircraft"


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## Initial Estimates of Annualized Avoided Emissions at PHL

	17AUG 07		
Airline	Departures	CO Emitted(lb)	NOx Emitted (lb)
9E	5	3,513	187
AA	22	12,628	673
AC	5	1,757	94
AF	1	1,008	54
BA	2	4,678	249
CO	11	8,534	455
DL	14	10,616	565
F9	2	-	-
FL	18	17,229	918
JM	1	101	5
LH	1	-	-
NW	13	2,750	146
OH	7	4,570	243
00	2	-	-
U5	3	(581)	(31)
UA	19	12,408	661
US	457	624,797	33,280
WN	66	97,068	5,170
XE	4	6,897	367
YV	1	567	30
YX	2	2,015	107
TOTALS	656	810,556	43,174

Based on annualizing 17 August 07 (as scheduled); emission rates per Levy et al.

### Results of Sensis Simulation for PHL 19Nov09





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## Example of Evaluating Benefits and Costs of Airport CDM

#### **BENEFIT COST FRAME WORK**

	Base Case	Modified Airport CDM	Alternatives Considered	
Definition	Current first come first served system with ramp/apron controlled by airlines and taxiways and departure control controlled by ATCT	Airport CDM via RBS where Airport/Vendor assigns time for an airline to have aircraft at a spot ready to taxi and Ramp control issues pushbacks consistent with slot allocation	(1) ATCT issues both pushback and taxiway clearances per CVG (2) ATCT issues both pusback and taxiway clearances per RBS	
		Tourism to ODM is DDO		
Institutional changes	None	Carriers agree to CDM via RBS Intercarrier agreement to have Ramp tower issue pushbacks to meet Airport/Vendor spot instructions and/or change in airport use agreement	FAA assumes control of ramp and apron; manages queue	
-				
Incremental Investment	None	See Surface Management Incremental Information Requirements	See Surface Management Incremental Information Requirements	
Incremental Operating Costs	None	Controller work load (ATCT; Ramp Tower); Airline dispatch work load; System Command Center workload	Controller work load (ATCT; Ramp Tower); Airline dispatch work load; System Command Center workload	
		•		
Benefits Metrics	Fuel consumed; emissions; improved TFM due to better departure information			

## Sample Calculation of BCA for Airport CDM at PHL

Sample PHL Airport CDM Benefit Cost Analysis  Discour					Discount Rate	7%	1			
Based only o	Based only on Average Fuel Savings 17 August 07 and 19Nov 09									
					Discounted					
<u> </u>		Investment		Annual	<u>'</u>	<u></u>	<u> </u>			
'	1	(based on		Personnel	1	'	'			Cumulative Net
Year	Fuel Benefits	EU Model)	Ann. IT Cost	Cost	Total Cost	Net Benefits	Fuel Benefits	Total Costs	Net Benefits	Benefits
0	1	\$3,900,000		'	\$3,900,000	\$(3,900,000)		\$ (3,644,860)	, , ,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
1 1	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$ 1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 2,765,441	\$ (1,410,604)		\$ (2,290,022)
2	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000		\$ 1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 2,584,525	\$ (1,318,321)		\$ (1,023,818)
3	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$ 1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 2,415,444	\$ (1,232,076)		\$ 159,549
4	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000		\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 2,257,424	\$ (1,151,473)		\$ 1,265,501
5	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 2,109,742	\$ (1,076,143)		\$ 2,299,100
6	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,971,721	\$ (1,005,741)		\$ 3,265,081
7	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,842,730	\$ (939,945)		\$ 4,167,866
8	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,722,178	\$ (878,453)	\$ 843,725	\$ 5,011,591
9	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,609,512	\$ (820,984)	\$ 788,528	\$ 5,800,119
10	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,504,217	\$ (767,275)	\$ 736,942	\$ 6,537,061
11	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,405,810	\$ (717,079)	\$ 688,731	\$ 7,225,792
12	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,313,841	\$ (670,168)	\$ 643,674	\$ 7,869,466
13	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,227,889	\$ (626,325)	\$ 601,564	\$ 8,471,030
14	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,147,560	\$ (585,350)	\$ 562,210	\$ 9,033,240
15	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,072,486	\$ (547,056)	\$ 525,429	\$ 9,558,669
16	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 1,002,323	\$ (511,268)	\$ 491,056	\$ 10,049,725
17	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 936,751	\$ (477,820)	\$ 458,930	\$ 10,508,655
18	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 875,468	\$ (446,561)	\$ 428,907	\$ 10,937,562
19	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 818,194	\$ (417,347)	\$ 400,848	\$ 11,338,410
20	\$ 3,166,154	1	\$ 375,000	\$1,240,000	\$1,615,000	\$ 1,551,154	\$ 764,668	\$ (390,044)	\$ 374,624	\$ 11,713,034
	Excess Taxi									
Sample Days	Hours Saved	1								
17-Aug-07	65	1				TOTAL	\$31,347,924	\$(19,634,891)	\$ 11,713,034	1
19-Nov-09	33	1						•		<u> </u>
Average	49	1						B/C Ratio	1.60	

Sources: 17 August 07 per GRA queueing model; 19 November 09 per Sensis Corporation Simulation; EU BCA model for Airport CDM



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#### **Conclusions**

- → Airport CDM shows promise
  - Rough BCA
  - Willingness of carriers to invest at JFK
- → Two control approaches: ATCT vs. Airport
  - Difference in who pays
  - ATCT-Centric is focus of Nextgen plan and suggests change ATCT role to include pushback clearance
  - Airport-Centric requires carrier assent and investment
- → Two allocation approaches: CVQ vs. RBS
  - CVQ preserves first come first served; passengers on-board before aircraft enters the queue
  - RBS diverts from first come first served; passengers could stay at gate (if feasible)
- Next Step: Refinement of definitions of alternatives and analysis of costs and benefits


### **Extra Slides**



# **Key Features of a Coordinator CDM System: Common Website**




### Key Feature: Demand and Capacity Profile





JFK Irrops System


## Key Feature: Situational Awareness Including Gates





JFK Irrops System GRA, Incorporated


# Key Feature: Slot Calculation Based on ADR and OAG



G


JFK Irrops System

# Key Feature: Common Website for Airline Schedule Update



JFK Irrops System


## Key Feature: Airline Assignment of Flights to Slots



JFK Irrops System

GRA, Incorporated I

# Key Feature: Coordinator Screen Where Slots Assigned



JFK Irrops System



## Simulation of DMAN at PHL

Jan. 12, 2010




#### **DMAN Simulation Description**


- Simulation of two scenarios:
  - No DMAN action. (Aircraft enter the movement area as soon as possible.)
  - With DMAN action. (Movement area entry is delayed.)
    - (Enter MA at last possible time minus 4 minutes.)
- Compare taxi times in the movement area between the scenarios.
  - Assume that when DMAN delays MA entry, the aircraft accepts the delay at the gate (engines off).
  - That is, assume ramp area taxi times are unchanged.
- ■Simulate one full day at PHL: Nov. 19, 2009



Simulation of 1 day: Nov. 19, 2009

#### Effect of DMAN on Taxi Times





#### Total Taxi Time in MA for Departures

	No DMAN	With DMAN	Difference
Total	91.2 hrs	57.7 hrs	33.4 hrs
Mean	9.0 min/op	5.7 min/op	3.3 min/op
Std. dev.	7.9 min/op	3.1 min/op	4.8 min/op

#### Excess Taxi Time in MA for Departures


	No DMAN	With DMAN	Difference
Total	51.6 hrs	18.2 hrs	33.4 hrs
Mean	5.1 min/op	1.8 min/op	3.3 min/op
Std. dev.	7.2 min/op	2.0 min/op	5.3 min/op



Simulation of 1 day: Nov. 19, 2009

#### Delay Time in the Ramp Area (At Gate)

- Reductions in movement area taxi times achieved by additional holding at the gate.
- Depends upon gate availability.
  - May send departure to a "holding area" if another flight needs the gate. (not simulated)



Ramp Delay Time for Departures						
	No DMAN	With DMAN	Difference			
Total	11.9 hrs	45.1 hrs	33.2 hrs			
Mean	1.2 min/op	4.5 min/op	3.3 min/op			
Std. dev.	3.9 min/op	7.6 min/op	3.6 min/op			