

# Distributed Trust Establishment and Computation in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks

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# Motivation

#### "Lack of trust" in mobile ad-hoc networks

- · No trusted centralized authority
- Rapidly changing topology and non-guaranteed connectivity due to mobility
- Vulnerability of links and identities because of wireless communication and open-air environment leads to
- · Power-constrained devices with poor protection

# Dynamic, distributed, self-organized, fault-resistant trust management model for MANET



# Trust Establishment

## **Bootstrapping**

When A makes a direct observation of B, A creates his own trust estimate  $T_{ab}$ .

Direct observations can be:

- Does User B forward A's packets? (Watchdog)
- · Has A visually identified B? (Mobility helps Security)
- Has A detected any misbehavior on B's part? (Distributed IDS)

## **Propagation**

- •Short time, online distribution
- Proactive or reactive
- •Peer-to-peer, self-organized and scalable
- •Fast update and revocation

## Combination

Along paths – concatenation functions

For path  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ ,  $T_{ac} = T_{ab} \otimes T_{bc}$  (e.g. multiplication, minimum value)

Across paths – aggregation function

For paths  $A \rightarrow B1 \rightarrow C$ ,  $A \rightarrow B2 \rightarrow C$ ,

 $T_{ac} = T_{a1c} \oplus \ T_{a2c}$  (e.g. maximum value, summation, average, majority votes)


# Trust Model

Physical Topology: graph  $G_p$ =(V,E $_p$ )

 $(i,j) \in E_p \Leftrightarrow i$  and j are within range of each other

Trust Topology: directed graph  $G_T = (V, E_T)$ 

 $(i,j) \in E_T \Leftrightarrow i$  has belief on j: direct trust or trust by recommendation



#### Trust Vector: T:

The jth component is the trust that node i has for i.

Trust value is usually in [0,1].

1 stands for complete trust

0 stands for complete distrust – Negative evidence

For more accurate modelling, trust value may not be scalar.

e.g. a pair (Trust, Confidence), where Trust is as before and Confidence corresponds to how certain i is for the Trust value he has assigned.


Trade-off between accuracy and complexity.

## Trust combination functions


Efficiently computable

Intuitive results

Difficult to manipulate



Concatenation along paths



# **Current Work**

#### Trust evidence distribution

Two schemes we have investigated: Freenet-based and swarm-intelligence-based

## Trust path exploration

User A sends Trust-Query for destination D to his one hop neighbors. Neighbor  $N_1$  picks "best" next hop  $N_2$ , appends his trust value  $T_{N_1\,N_2}$  to the Trust-Query and forwards it to  $N_2$ .

#### Trust routing

Next Trust-hop chosen according to the trust metric (analogous to routing and delay metric)

## Distributed trust computation

Computation based on local information

Optimal decision theory:

 $\hat{T}_{ij} = E[T_{ij} \mid C_{ij}; R_{n_i}, C_{n_i}; ... R_{n_j}, C_{n_i}] \text{ , where } T_{ij} \text{ is the trust value to be evaluated, } C_{kl} \text{ is the direct observation of } k \text{ on } l, R_{kl} \text{ is the recommendation of } l \text{ by } k$ 

#### Local and global effect:

Investigating Markov random field, Ising model

Energy function:  $C(T) = \sum_{i} A_{ii}T_{i}T_{i} - B\sum_{i} T_{i}$ 

Dynamic trajectories and convergence behavior

Threshold parameters and phase transition properties

### Emergent Patterns

Simple rules based on strictly local information lead to global trust patterns. Effect of adversaries cannot spread.

# **Future Work**

- · Further evaluate different statistical detection and estimation methods
- · Relate MRF with statistical estimation methods
- Investigate game theory and Ising model for convergence analysis of distributed inference
- Further mathematical analysis in swarm intelligence scheme in relation to MRF and simulating annealing (SA)
- Specify trust computation policies with respect to logic and formal methods
- Need to incorporate non-monotonic logic along with negative evidence, false evidence

# Acknowledgement

This work is sponsored by U.S. Army Research Laboratory under cooperative agreement #  $\mathsf{DAAD19}\text{-}01\text{-}2\text{-}0011$