

## Objective and Motivation \*

- **Objective:** Analyze cross-layering problems in *wireless ad hoc networks* from the perspective of stochastic games

- Building block: **Simple Relay Channel**



- Joint Routing & Random Access (Network Layer) (MAC Layer)

- **Motivation:** Wireless ad hoc networks consist of selfish (non-cooperative) nodes with conflicting interests:

- Intertwined conflicts of **throughput, energy** and **delay**
- More **robust** since selfish behavior prevents cheating for channel access purposes
- Inherently **distributed** and **scalable**

## Simple Relay Channel Model

- One source (node 1), relay (node 2), destination (node 3)
  - Simplest form of multi-hop communication with 2 choices:
    - (a) **Direct Communication**
      - Conflicting throughput interests
    - (b) **Forwarding over relay node**
      - Not throughput or energy-efficient for relay node
      - Stimulation for cooperation is needed
  - **Classical** assumption: Nodes cooperate for relaying
  - **New** assumption: Relay generates packet for destination
- **Classical Collision Channel** Model:
  - Three channel outputs: **Idle, Success, or Collision**
  - Secondary packet conflicts **not** allowed
  - Simultaneous transmission and reception **not** allowed
- Relaying rule & reward-based **stimulation** for cooperation
  - If node 2 accepts packet of node 1:
    - Node 1 receives payoff  $c$  from node 2
    - Node 2 undertakes future rewards and costs
  - If node 2 rejects packet of node 1, a “**collision**” occurs

## Network Model and Actions


- Wireless ad-hoc network with three nodes:
  - **Synchronous slotted** system with queue sizes of one 1
  - Nodes 1, 2 generate packets with probability  $a_1$  and  $a_2$
  - Transmitter has **three** possible actions at each time slot:
    - $A_1$ : Transmitting packet directly to destination
    - $A_2$ : Transmitting a packet to relay node
    - $A_3$ : Waiting
  - Relay node has **four** possible actions at each time slot:
    - Full Queue:  $B_1$ : Direct transmission  
 $B_2$ : Waiting
    - Empty Queue:  $C_1$ : Accepting packet for forwarding  
 $C_2$ : Rejecting packet for forwarding

## Strategies, Utilities and Objectives

- Strategies:  $\underline{s} = (\underline{s}_1, \underline{s}_2) = (p_1, p_2, q, r)$ 
  - $p_1, p_2, q, r$ : probability of selecting actions  $A_1, A_2, B_1, C_1$
- Costs and rewards :
  - **Delay** cost  $d$  for waiting or unsuccessful transmission
  - Energy cost  $E_{i,j}$  for transmission from node  $i$  to node  $j$
  - Reward 1 for delivering packet to common destination
- State :  $(Q_1, Q_2)$ ,  $Q_i = 1$  if queue of node  $i$  is full and  $Q_i = 0$  if queue of node  $i$  is empty
  - At each slot, node  $i$  makes decision depending on  $Q_i$
  - Expected **stationary** utility:  $U_i(\underline{s}) = \sum_{k_j \in K} \pi_j(s) E_i^u(k_j, \underline{s})$
  - **Partially observable** states  $K = \{(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)\}$
  - $\pi_j(\underline{s})$ : Stationary probability of state  $k_j$  under strategy  $\underline{s}$
  - $E_i^u(k_j, \underline{s})$ : Immediate utility (reward - cost) expected by user  $i$  under strategy  $\underline{s}$  at state  $k_j$
- Objectives of nodes :
  - **Non-cooperative:** Nodes independently select  $\underline{s}_i$  to maximize individual utilities  $U_i(\underline{s})$
  - **Cooperative:** Nodes jointly select  $\underline{s}$  to maximize the total system utility  $U_1(\underline{s}) + U_2(\underline{s})$

## Numerical Results

- Strategies in terms of  $\kappa = E_{1,3}/E_{1,2}$ ,  $c$ ,  $a_1$  and  $a_2$



- Expected utilities in selfish and social equilibrium:

$E_{1,2} = E_{2,3} = d = 0.1$ $a_1 = 0.25, c = 0.4$	$a_2 = 0$ $\kappa = 1$	$a_2 = 0.25$ $\kappa = 1$	$a_2 = 0$ $\kappa = 5$	$a_2 = 0.25$ $\kappa = 5$
$U_1 + U_2$ (Non-cooperative)	0.15	0.2425	0.1355	0.2383
$U_1 + U_2$ (Cooperative)	0.15	0.2637	0.1467	0.2546

- **Result** : Cooperation is better than selfish decisions

## Possible Improvements

- Waiting for transmission of **forwarded** packets
- **Immediate** transmission of **new** and **accepted** packets

$E_{1,2} = E_{2,3} = d = 0.1$ $a_1 = 0.25, c = 0.4$	$a_2 = 0$ $\kappa = 1$	$a_2 = 0.25$ $\kappa = 1$	$a_2 = 0$ $\kappa = 5$	$a_2 = 0.25$ $\kappa = 5$
$U_1 + U_2$ (Non-cooperative)	0.15	0.2482	0.1474	0.2494
$U_1 + U_2$ (Cooperative)	0.15	0.2708	0.1496	0.2697

\* The material presented in this poster is based on paper “A Game-Theoretic Look at Simple Relay Channel”, Yalin Evren Sagduyu, Anthony Ephremides, in Proc. WIOPT’04, Mar. 2004.