

INFORMATION THEORETIC NETWORK SECRET KEY GENERATION

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Notions of Security

Computational Security

- Existing cryptosystems – public key as well as secret key – are based on the notion of **computational security**.
- This notion relies on the difficulty currently faced in solving a “hard” computational problem, e.g., the existence of “one-way” functions.
- Recent advances in computing may present theoretical challenges to currently implemented cryptosystems.

Information Theoretic Security

- A complementary approach for **secret key** cryptosystems
- Unconditional security**: A **quantifiable and provable** notion of security, with no assumption of “one-way” functions and no restrictions on the computational power of adversary.
- Benefits: **Innate connections with multiterminal data compression and channel coding**.
- Challenges: New algorithms for secret key construction.

Special Model I: Correlated Gaussian Signals

Let X_1 and X_2 be jointly Gaussian random variables with $X_1 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_1^2)$, $X_2 \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_2^2)$, and $E[X_1 X_2] = \rho \sigma_1 \sigma_2$, $|\rho| < 1$. Then, the SK capacity is

$$C_S = I(X_1 \wedge X_2) = \frac{1}{2} \log \left(\frac{1}{1 - \rho^2} \right).$$

Main Contributions:

- A new scheme for achieving the SK capacity using structured codes: nested lattice codes and linear codes
- A characterization of the optimum tradeoff between SK rate and quantization rate.

Special Model II: Pairwise Independent Network Model

$$X_1 = (X_{12}, \dots, X_{1m})$$

$$X_2 = (X_{21}, X_{23}, \dots, X_{2m})$$

$$X_m = (X_{m1}, \dots, X_{m,m-1})$$


- $X_i = (X_{ij}, j \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{i\})$, $i = 1, \dots, m$.
- X_{ij} is correlated with X_{ji} , $1 \leq i \neq j \leq m$.
- (X_{ij}, X_{ji}) independent across i, j .

Secret Key Generation by Public Communication

- Multiple user terminals observe separate but correlated signals, e.g., different noisy versions of a common broadcast signal or measurements of a parameter of the environment.
- The terminals wish to generate a **secret key**, to which end they then communicate publicly over a noiseless channel. A secret key is common randomness generated at each terminal which is **effectively concealed** from an eavesdropper with access to the public communication.
- The secret key thereby generated can be used for encrypted communication.
- Application: Security with a one-time pad in a wireless network.

Secret Key Generation Algorithm

For any fixed $R > 0$, both terminals agree on n -dim. nested lattice codes $\Lambda_1 \supset \Lambda_2 \supset \Lambda_3$ with a suitable selection of α as a function of $R, D, \sigma_X, \sigma_Y, \rho$.



Connection to Rate Distortion Theory

- \mathbf{L} is approximately an optimum rate distortion codeword of \mathbf{X}_1 of rate R .
- \mathbf{P} is approximately an optimum Wyner-Ziv codeword of \mathbf{X}_2 given \mathbf{X}_1 as side information, of rate R .

$$R_p(R) = \frac{1}{2} \log \left[\left((e^{2R} - 1)(1 - \rho^2) + 1 \right) \right].$$

Tradeoff Between SK Rate and Quantization Rate

For any $R > 0$, there exist n -dimensional nested lattice codes $\Lambda_1 \supset \Lambda_2 \supset \Lambda_3$ such that the algorithm above produces a random variable \mathbf{L} of rate arbitrarily close to R , from which a SK $K = \mathbf{L} - Q_{\Lambda_3}(\mathbf{L})$ can be constructed of rate

$$C(R) = \frac{1}{2} \log \left[\left((1 - \rho^2) + \rho^2 e^{-2R} \right) \right].$$

Furthermore, $C(R)$ is optimum among all schemes with quantization at terminal 1 of rate R , followed by public communication based on the quantized signal at terminal 1.

Secret Key Capacity

$$C_S = \min_{2 \leq k \leq m} \min_{\substack{k \text{-partitions} \\ \{B_1, \dots, B_k\}}} \frac{1}{k-1} \sum_{l=1}^{k-1} \left[\sum_{i \in B_l} \sum_{j \in \cup_{t=l+1}^k B_t} I(X_{ij} \wedge X_{ji}) \right].$$

Secret Key Generation Algorithm

- Generate independent pairwise SKs. For (i, j) , best SK rate is


$$I(X_{ij} \wedge X_{ji}), \quad 1 \leq i \neq j \leq m.$$

- Can assume all such SKs to consist of an integer number of bits.
- Consider a **complete** multigraph, with no. of edges between a pair of nodes = lengths of SK (bits).



- An achievable common SK length = max no. of edge-disjoint spanning trees which can be packed in this multigraph.
- Optimality**: Using Nash-Williams and Tutte (1961), we show that our algorithm produces a SK of optimum rate.
- Efficiency**: Our algorithm has linear-time complexity in n .

What is a Secret Key?



Secret Key (SK): K is a SK for A , achievable with communication F if

- $Pr\{K = K_i, i \in A\} \cong 1$ (common randomness)
- $I(K \wedge F) \cong 0$ (secrecy)
- $H(K) \cong \log(\text{cardinality of key space})$ (uniformity)

Thus, a secret key, shared by the terminals in A , is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access to F , and is nearly uniformly distributed.

- Objectives: (i) Determine the largest rate of such an achievable SK: SK capacity
(ii) Construct a SK of maximal rate.